In this work, the problem of performing abduction in modal logics is addressed, along the lines of 3], where a proof theoretical abduction method for full rst order classical logic is de ned, based on tableaux and Gentzen-type systems. This work applies the same methodology to face modal abduction. The non-classical context enforces the value of analytical proof systems as tools to face the meta-logical and proof-theoretical questions involved in abductive reasoning.
Abductive reasoning and modal logics
Many forms of commonsense reasoning are not deductive in nature. Reasonable inferences may be performed even if leading to conclusions that are not certain but only plausible. Abduction is one of such inference schemata that re ect unsound forms of inference. Abductive reasoning is a way to solve problems where an observed event ' is not explained by the presently adopted theory and an explanation for ' has to be looked for.
A precise de nition of abductive explanations is obviously dependent on the logic underlying the theory : some fact could explain ' in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic or linear logic. So, let us assume that a logic L is given, with a corresponding relation of logical consequence j = L . Then an abduction problem in L consists of a background theory and a formula ' such that 6 j = L '. A solution of the problem given by the pair h ; 'i is to be chosen among the formulae such that f g j = L '. In general, it is not even required that j = L satis es the tarskian properties for a consequence relation. For example, it makes sense to think of (and it would be worth exploring) non-monotonic explanations, i.e. cases where explains ' but ^ does not 2], so that the notion of explanation is related to a non-monotonic consequence relation. In this perspective, abduction in the logic programming context, with its tricks (like constraints), can be seen as the form of abduction that is carried out in the logic induced by the semantics of the arrow and negation-as-failure operators.
Recently, much attention has been paid to abductive reasoning in di erent elds of Arti cial Intelligence, such as diagnosis 4, 5, 13, 12] , interpretation of natural language sentences 7, 15], plan recognition 1], scene interpretation 14]. This work is a contribution to the characterization of abduction as a form of inference whose context is only the logic it depends upon. Abstraction from any particular problem helps to focus on general theoretical questions, while results can be obtained that bene t the applicative elds.
In this work, the problem of performing abduction in modal logics is addressed. The meaningfulness of such a problem can be recognized by considering two simple examples: the rst is from Arti cial Intelligence, the second from program veri cation.
Let us assume that an agent is reasoning about her own knowledge, represented by a modal theory , and she observes that ' is consistent with her knowledge, i.e. 3' is true. However, 3' is not derivable in . Abduction would produce what is needed to sanction 3'. Of course, the importance of epistemic abduction is clearer when considering multiple agent contexts: for example, both natural language understanding and user modeling require the ability to abduce the goals of the speaker, and student modeling includes the abduction of the student's beliefs from the observation of her answers to questions and problems. As a second example, let us assume that a program is described by a theory in a temporal or dynamic logic L and that the termination property for is represented by the formula '. Then, determining the class of input data for which terminates can be seen as abducing a precondition such that f g j = L '.
In 3] analytical proof systems are proposed as suitable tools to face the metalogical and proof-theoretical questions involved in abductive reasoning and a proof theoretical abduction method for full rst order classical logic is de ned.
The underlying idea is to solve the abduction problem h ; 'i by building a formula that closes the open branches of a tableau for f:'g. The method does not require any preliminary reduction of formulae into normal forms, but dynamic skolemization is used. In the rst order case, quanti ers are to be reintroduced following a sort of reverse skolemization. This work applies the same methodology to face modal abduction. There are obvious similarities between quanti ers and modal operators (see, among others, 11] for a functional translation method of modal formulae into rst order formulae). As far as the tableau based abduction method is concerned, however, a main di erence lies in that the structure of a quanti ed formula is essentially rebuildable from its Skolem forms, while the trace of modal operators, once they are dropped, is lost. This fact induces a recursive reformulation of the construction of the abduced formulae, thus shifting the view from a meta-logical level to a logical one. The resulting construction is in strict relation with the expansion rules for the modal logic, in a modular manner that makes local modi cations possible, so as to t the method to di erent modal systems. In fact, the abductive method given in this paper is general, in the sense that it can be adapted to any propositional modal logic for which analytic tableaux are provided. Moreover, the way towards an extension to rst order modal logic is straightforward.
Basic notions about modal logics
The logical language of modal systems consists of all the classical logical symbols and the modal operator 2 (necessity). Modal formulae are de ned consequently. Formulae of the form 2 are called boxed formulae. The modal operator 3 is de ned as follows: 3 :2: .
In the sequel we consider modal systems characterizable by a subset of the following schemata: The semantics of modal logics is de ned as usual in terms of L-modal structures M = hW; R L ; Vi, where W is a non empty set (of possible worlds), R L is a binary relation on W (accessibility relation), whose properties depend on the logic L, and V is a truth assignment, that maps W P into ftrue; falseg, where P is the set of propositional symbols of the language. The notion of truth of a formula in a world w 2 W, (M; w) j = , is de ned as usual.
The notion of logical consequence in a modal logic L is not always given the same de nition. Two versions are commonly used: 
for all w 2 W (for all 2 , (M; w) j = implies (M; w) j = ).
Clearly, if is not empty,
If is empty, the two notions collapse, so that in particular the notion of validity they induce is the same (this is the reason why any of the two versions can be often used without discrepancies). The version (F) corresponds to the notion of derivability in axiomatic systems (with necessitation), while (K) corresponds to derivability of the corresponding sequent in sequent calculi. Consequently, the main di erence between the two versions is that the following properties:
hold for (K) but not for (F) (their converses are true in both cases). Thus, (K) is closer to the classical notion of logical consequence. In recent literature (F) is often preferred because of its greater generality. However, in this work, we use (K) just because it de nes a stronger relation and, consequently, it corresponds to a more general notion of abduction: if f g j = K L ' then f g j = F L ', but the converse is not true. In the context of abduction, the use of (K) is more reasonable (there does not seem to be much sense in assuming that is a good explanation for 2 ) and it allows the duality between deduction and abduction to be preserved. Of course, the same concepts could be de ned by use of (F) and implication, but the notation would be far more cumbersome.
In the following we shall simply use the symbol j = L instead of j = K L .
Basic notions about modal abduction
Abductive explanations are in general required to respect some fundamental conditions, in order to be accepted as \interesting". If well settled consequence relations j = L are considered, such as the classical, modal or intuitionistic ones, the following restrictions are to be reasonably imposed on explanations for an abduction problem h ; 'i:
(i) is consistent with , i.e. 6 j = L : .
(ii) is a minimal explanation for the abduction problem h ; 'i, i.e. for any
Moreover, the syntactical form of explanations is usually restricted; for example, in rst order classical logic, an explanation is a prenex formula whose matrix is a conjunction of literals. A logical reason for this has been pointed out by 9]: if = f 1 ; : : : ; n g is nite, then any minimal explanation for h ; 'i is equivalent to 1^: : :^ n ! '. The following de nition is a straightforward adaptation to the modal language of the classical syntactical restriction on explanations.
De nition 1 (modal C-formulae) A formula is a modal C-formula if it is built up from literals using only the modal operators 2 and 3 and conjunction.
Consequently:
De nition 2 (L-explanations for abduction problems) is an explanation for the abduction problem h ; 'i if it is a C-formula in the language of f'g and f g j = L '.
When an explanation is required to be either minimal or consistent with the theory, it will be explicitly stated. L-equivalent explanations are considered as identical, so that L-explanations are in fact equivalence classes of formulae (the terms L-equivalence, L-derivability, etc. are used in the obvious sense).
2 Modal abduction by use of analytic tableaux Semantic tableaux are used as refutation systems. They are built by means of a set of rules that preserve satis ability of sets of formulae. In this work we make use of the unsigned version of modal tableaux 6]. Modal expansion rules are stated as follows, where set union is brie y denoted by the comma, in the obvious sense; for example, ; ; 0 is a short-cut for f g 0 . Moreover, 2 is a set of boxed formulae and 0 is a set of non boxed formulae. The standard formulation of analytic tableau systems does not make explicit reference to structural rules. However, we assume that the following form of weakening is among the rules of the systems: 2 ; 0 2 where 0 contains no boxed formulae. This rule is certainly redundant for the aims of theorem proving, but it is needed to guarantee the completeness of the abduction procedure for the systems K, T and S4 (the reason can be found in the proof given in the Appendix).
In the classical case, the construction of an explanation can be done only on the basis of the set of the open leaves of the tableau, without need to store and work on the structure of the whole tableau: a literal is chosen for each open leaf, that closes the corresponding branch; the set of literals is conjoined and quanti ers are reintroduced. In fact, the elimination of quanti ers by means of skolemization preserves the information about their mutual dependencies that is needed to reintroduce them. In contrast to these, modal operators cannot be correctly reintroduced without considering the structure of the tableau, where they may disappear without leaving any trace. This fact is intuitively explained by the following simple example. Let us consider the more general problem of nding a formula that is L-inconsistent with a set . Let L = D, = f2' _ 2 g and 0 = f2(' _ )g; the following trees are D-tableaux for and 0 , respectively. (i) contains no literals and can be expanded.
(ii) contains some formula that can be expanded by means of a classical logical rule;
(iii) contains some 2 that can be expanded but has not yet been expanded in B; In other words, the expansion of B is compulsory whenever it can be performed without the loss of information that is useful for abduction and without cycling. Note that the application of a -rule is not always compulsory.
De nition 4 (Fundamental tableaux) Let T be a tableau. A branch B of T is fundamental if its expansion is not compulsory. A node is fundamental if it is the leaf of a fundamental branch. T is fundamental if all its branches are fundamental.
Note that a fundamental node always contains some literals, unless the logic considered is K. In this case, a node that contains only boxed formulae is T 0 , where = is an application of the -rule to 2 . We distinguish two cases:
(i) If either is empty or it contains only boxed formulae, then 
Existence of minimal explanations
If h ; 'i is an abductive problem, let ( ; ') denote the set of all the fundamental L-tableaux for f:'g. By the completeness theorem, the set of minimal explanations for h ; 'i is included in the set E L ( ; ') =
The question whether min(E L ( ; ')) may be empty is addressed here.
In the case of rst order logic, there are abduction problems that admit no minimal explanation 9], because there exist in nite descending chains of formulae. This is not the case for modal logic.
For the non transitive logics K, D and T, the existence of minimal explanations follows from the fact that the number of fundamental tableaux for a given problem h ; 'i is nite, therefore E L ( ; ') is nite. In fact, at any step in the expansion of a tableau there is only a nite number of choices and the construction of any tableau terminates, because each application of a rule of K and D decreases the number of logical operators; in T the number of logical operators may not be reduced by a -rule, but it is as soon as a -rule is applied (if a node contains no -formulae, reapplications of -rules can be avoided).
The case of the logic S4 is not so simple. In fact, there exist in nite tableaux, i.e. there may be an in nite number of fundamental tableaux for a given abductive problem. The fact that in nite tableaux cycle does not help, because every cycle could generate weaker explanations and in S4 there is an in nite number of distinct modal functions, even of a single propositional variable. So, in principle, a given problem may lack minimal explanations.
However, the following theorem solves the problem of the existence of minimal explanations for S4 too.
Theorem 3 Let h ; 'i be an abductive problem in a propositional modal logic L that enjoys the nite model property. Then: (i) there exists a minimal explanation of h ; 'i, and (ii) for any explanation of h ; 'i there exists a minimal explanation min such that j = min .
A proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix.
Concluding remarks
Abduction in a logic may be approached in several ways, at least one for every deductive method de ned for the logic. However abduction in modal logic has never been addressed so far. Obviously, the results of this work are only a rst step towards a good characterization of modal abduction and leave a number of problems to be solved. An improvement of the method can be obtained by use of pre xed tableaux, that in modal deduction reduces the number of tableaux to be considered. Apart from a gain in e ciency, pre xes could help in storing important information on the \history" of the modal operators in the same way as the use of Skolem functions code the position and quality of quanti ers that are eliminated. However, commonly used pre xes 6] do not allow the abductive construction to be based only on the leaves of the tree, like in classical logic. In fact, those prexes keep track of the application of modal rules whatsoever, without storing any information about which rules have been applied. A careful rede nition of pre xes to be used for abduction is therefore to be done, following the intuition given in 10, 11, 8] .
